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This  paper  summarizes  the  basic  arguments  given  by  professors  Christian 
Bordes,  David  Currie  and  Hans  Soderstrom  in  their  reports  on the state  and 
behaviour of the Finnish economy prior to mid  1993. The focus is primarily  on 
the analytical  frameworks or models  used  by  the  professors  to  organize  their 
thoughts  on  the  Finnish  economy,  and,  admittedly,  at  some  risk  of  over- 
simplification interpretes the reports through common analytical principles.  The 
paper argues that basically each of the reports subscribes to the idea of a credit 
cycle  as  the  driving  force  behind  the  development  of  the  Finnish  economy 
during  the  last  ten  years  or  so.  Thus  the  very  nature  of  the  credit  cycle  is 
analyzed  in  the paper  and  interpreted  in  a  way  suitable for  economic  policy 
analysis.  This discussion is followed by  the policy  analysis, which is organized 
through  a sequence of  policy  issues and  proposals  raised  by  the professors  in 
their  reports.  The paper  tries  to  emphasize  and  evaluate those  aspects  of  the 
analysis pursued by  the professors which relate to the (lack of) credibility of the 
then prevailing policy regime and the feasibility  of the various policy measures 
taken. Finally, the paper draws attention  to some of  the ideas discussed  by  the 
professors related to future policy options in Finland. 
Tiivistelma 
Tassa  artikkelissa  arvioidaan  professoreiden  Christian  Bordes,  David  Currie ja 
Hans  Soderstrom  raporteissaan  esittamia  ajatuksia  Suomen  talouden  tilasta  ja 
kehityksesta  ennen  vuoden  1993 puoltavalia.  Tarkasteluissa  painotetaan,  ehka 
liiallisenkin  yksinkertaistamisen  uhalla,  professoreiden  ajatusten  yhteisia 
analyyttisia  lahtokohtia.  Erityisesti  pyritaan  argumentoimaan  sen puolesta,  etta 
kukin  professoreista  tulkitsee  Suomen  talouden  kymmenen  viimeisen  vuoden 
kehityksen  luottosykliksi.  Nain  ollen  artikkelin  tarkastelut  alkavat  luottosyklin 
taloudellisella tarkastelulla ja  sen tulkinnalla  talouspolitiikan analyysin kannalta. 
Tata  keskustelua  seuraa  itse  raporttien  politiikka-analyysien  arviointi,  joka 
rakentuu  teemoittain  ja  professorien  raporteissa  esittamien  talouspoliittisten 
ehdotusten mukaan.  Niista  professorien  analyysien nakokohdista, jotka  liittyvat 
taannoin  harjoitetun  talouspolitiikan  uskottavuuteen  (tai  sen puutteeseen) ja  eri 
politiikkatoimenpiteiden  kayttokelpoisuuteen,  pyritaan  erityisesti  keskustele- 
maan. Artikkelin lopuksi kiinnitetaan huomio joihinkin  professoreiden  ajatuksiin 
Suomen tulevista politiikkavaihtoehdoista. Contents 
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At  the  beginning  of  1993  the  Bank  of  Finland  invited  three  experts  to 
participate in  the public debate on Finnish economic policy. The experts called 
upon  by  the  Bank  of  Finland  were  Professor  Christian  Bordes,  UniversitC de 
Bordeaux,  Professor  David  Currie, London  Business  School,  and  Professor 
Hans  Tson  Soderstrom,  Stockholm  School  of  Economics  and  Center  for 
Business  Policy  Studies.  Their  reports  were  issued  on  June  23,  1993  and 
subsequently published  in the book  "Three Assessments of Finland's  Economic 
Crisis and Economic Policy", Bank of Finland C:9, 1993. 
The  experts  were  originally  asked  to  present  their  views  on  the  following 
questions: 
-  What  are  the  short-term  and  long-term  reasons  leading  to  the  present 
economic situation, including the role of economic policy? 
-  What are the connections between a policy aiming toward a stable currency 
and the structural development of the economy (growth and employment)? 
-  What  economic  policy,  including  monetary  policy,  would  seem  advisable 
today and over the medium term? 
Furthermore,  the  experts  were  asked  to  present  their  views  on  the  overall 
development  of  the  economy  and  the  significance  of  the  various  aspects  of 
economic policy in this regard. 
The  appraisals  of  the  foreign  experts  have  not,  at  least  for  the  time  being, 
heated  up the debate on Finnish economic policy appreciably. Their viewpoints 
have indeed been used  in certain specific economic policy  questions, but partly 
in a way that does not do justice  to their work. Their views on various aspects 
of  economic  policy  do not  fit  in  very  easily  with  the  debate  carried  on  by 
Finnish  interest  groups.  Everyone  finds  something  good  in  them,  but  since 
nobody having a direct bearing upon the economy has escaped criticism there is 
a  great  temptation  to  keep  silent  about  the  reports  or,  even  worse,  pick  and 
choose the spots that support only their own views. 
Even  this  appraisal  of  the expert's  reports  addresses  only  part  of  the material 
they  present on the Finnish  economy  and  economic policy.  In  this respect we 
are  like  all  the  other  "debaters".  We  have  nevertheless  tried  to  familiarize 
ourselves  with  their  reports  as  a  whole  and  selected  questions  for  analysis 
which  to  our  minds  constitute  the  gist  of  their  message.  We  have  left,  for 
instance, their appraisal  of structural  issues for others to judge.  In our opinion 
they reflect to a large extent the "voices" of the Finnish experts who have been 
briefing them, e.g.  as regards  the  labour market and  incomes  policy,  but  these 
aspects  are already well known  to  Finns.  The handling  of  structural questions 
reveals  a  glaring  lack  of  research  material  on  Finnish  structural  and  growth 
policy.  We concentrate upon the views of the experts regarding the reasons and consequences of Finland's  credit cycle as well as on monetary  policy, especially 
with respect to the role of exchange rate policy. 
1  Credit Cycle 
At the risk of simplification,  it can be said  that  professors  Bordes, Currie and 
Soderstrom started from the idea that during the last ten years Finland has gone 
through  a  credit  cycle,  i.e.  gone  from  a  strong  expansion  of  the  financial 
markets  to their  contraction  and even to a financial crisis and  "credit crunch". 
Financial factors have thereby exacerbated the already wide cyclical fluctuations 
in the Finnish economy. Owing to the changes that took place in the conditions 
prevailing in the financial markets in the 1980s the professors evaluate the latter 
half  of  the  1980s and  especially  the deep  recession  from  the  perspective  of 
financing. 
There  are  indeed  differences  in  the  presentations,  among  other  things,  with 
respect to how the impact of financial factors are analyzed  and which stages of 
the  credit  cycle  are  stressed  in  the  reports.  Thus  David  Currie  evaluates  the 
theoretical  background  of  the credit cycle and  behaviour of  the real  exchange 
rate in the different stages of the credit cycle, with conclusions focusing on the 
crucial role of the exchange rate  in  the depreciation  of  the real exchange rate. 
Christian Bordes provides a rather detailed overview of the various stages of the 
credit cycle in the Finnish economy, stressing on the other hand the significance 
of  the  deregulation  of  the  financial  markets  spawned  by  the  "liberalization 
shock" within the context of  the growth of  the 1980s. Bordes emphasised  that 
the signs of the financial crisis that ensued after this growth period were clearly 
apparent already  in the late 1980s. Tson Soderstrom  in turn concentrates in his 
report  on building  a  case for the  (Fisherian)  notion that  the Finnish  economy 
has been driven onto a debt-deflation path.  It can perhaps be said that the main 
emphasis of  his report is on the latter stages of the credit cycle. 
1.1 Credit Cycle: What Is It? 
The  economic  and  institutional  developments  taking  place  in  the  Finnish 
economy in the last ten years certainly offer an opportunity to gain insight as to 
how  immense changes in the financial conditions  affect economic growth  and 
the business  cycle.  The specification of the behavioral effects of these changes 
in  line  with  the  so-called  credit  cycle  hypothesis  or  model  is  analytically 
speaking  clearly  the  common  denominator  in  the  professors'  reports.  The 
underlying  presumption  in  the  credit  cycle  model  is  that,  by  and  large,  the 
deregulation  of  the  financial  markets  led  to  a  fundamental  change  in  credit 
market  equilibrium  so that  it  was  sought  to  transform  a  greater  amount  of 
deposits  into  credit.  This  kind  of  "credit  shock"  stimulates  demand  and 
borrowing,  mainly  as  a result  of  the decline in  (lending)  rates  spurred  by  the 
shock.  Borrowing  can be deemed  to  increase  also  partly  due to  the fact  that 
borrowers  previously  subject to  liquidity  constraints were able to increase their borrowing. A consequence of  all the expansion in demand is that  it would  take 
higher  levels  of  output  and  interest  rates  in  capital  markets  to  balance  the 
commodity  and  money  markets,  but  if  capital  movements are completely  free 
internationally and the exchange rate fixed, the domestic money supply must be 
increased  in  order  to  balance  the  economy.  In  the  contrary  case  when  the 
supply  of credit  in  the economy  begins  to  dwindle and  lending rates  rise,  the 
economy  seeks  its equilibrium  at  a  lower  level  of  output  and  money  supply, 
assuming that as above there is still a fixed exchange rate regime. 
1.2 Credit Cycle and the Macro-Economy 
The  credit  cycle  thus  typically  strengthens  the  fluctuations  in  aggregate 
economic demand,  and  for example professor  Currie asserts  in  his  report  that 
these fluctuations  in aggregate demand  are stronger when the exchange rate is 
fixed  and  capital  movements  free.  A  consequence  of  the  latter  is  that  the 
domestic money supply must  adjust to  a level where there are no pressures  on 
the  exchange  rate.  The  strengthening  of  fluctuations  in  aggregate  demand 
typically  means  the  strengthening  of  fluctuations  in  the  sheltered  sector  in 
particular so that, as professor  Currie stresses, the credit cycle is supplemented 
by  real exchange rate cycle. 
It  is  almost self-evident that  the movements  in the real exchange rate must  be 
seen  as  part  of  the  balancing  of  the  economy  and  that  credit  expansion  is 
typically  followed  by  problems  in the external balance,  in this  case the deficit 
in the balance of trade, which is caused  by  the dwindling of export supply and 
growing import demand. On the other hand, less attention has been focused on 
the exacerbation of the external balance problem via the allocation of resources. 
The real  exchange rate typically  appreciates during times of  an upswing and  a 
boom  as  a  result  of  domestic  inflation  being  higher  than  that  abroad,  while 
during  a  recession  the real  exchange rate  is  lowered  by  a  devaluation  of  the 
markka. 
Of  these,  the  latter  (which  is  typically  caused  by  the  former)  is  especially 
problematic from the standpoint of balancing the economy for two reasons:  the 
presumed  effects on the balancing  of  the economy  via the depreciation  of  the 
markka (primarily via resource allocation) hinges upon how the equilibrium real 
exchange rate changes. The depreciation of  the markka does not  yet  mean the 
depreciation  of  the  real  exchange rate  -  the  latter  is  an  endogenous  variable. 
Thus the equilibrium size of the open sector will not necessarily grow after the 
devaluation.  At least Swedes know that the opposite can happen!  On the other 
hand,  it  is entirely possible  that  seeking to  alleviate the structural  problems  of 
the economy with exchange rate policy  can lead  to problems in the credibility 
of the exchange rate system  as a reflection of  the above-average  inflation  and 
periodic  devaluations.  This  possibility  is  not  analyzed  sufficiently  by  the 
professors,  not even by  Currie, who is the most outspoken in basing his policy 
conclusions  and  recommendations  on  exchange  rate  policy  and  on  its 
possibilities to permanently bolster the relative prices of the open sector. Also,  the  growth-driven  behaviour  of  asset  prices  is  typical  of  credit  cycles. 
This  kind  of  asset  price  behaviour,  especially  of  stock  and  housing  prices 
behaviour,  is,  in  addition  to  debt,  the  important  factor  spurring  especially 
professor  Bordes  to  affirm  that  the  signs  of  the  coming  crisis  were  clearly 
visible  already  during  the  boom  of  the  late  1980s,  and  giving  him  cause  to 
speak of the current recession more in terms of a financial crisis. 
The asset price cycle cannot be regarded  as exclusively a Finnish phenomenon, 
as the professors point out. What factors then promoted  the sharp rise in asset 
prices  in the late  1980s and  their collapse at  the end of  the decade? Here one 
should not  forget  the strong improvement in the terms of trade resulting from 
the decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s  nor the easing of international money 
markets and the decline in interest rates after the 1987 stock market crash in the 
US.  The  analysis  of  these  factors  by  the  professors  in  their  reports  remains 
rather shallow,  although professor  Bordes  notes  that  the rise  in asset prices  in 
Finland  must  be  seen  as  being  part  of  the  international  boom,  which  can  be 
explained  to  a  great  extent  by  precisely  this  easing  in  monetary  policy  after 
1987. On the other hand, the decline and collapse in asset prices toward the end 
of  the  1980s  was  spurred,  according  to  Bordes,  by  the  tightening  of 
international  money  markets  and  the  consequent  rise  in  interest  rates.  The 
tightening of monetary  conditions occurred  in  conjunction with measures taken 
by  the central banks to curb inflation. 
A third factor typically associated with the credit cycle is the strong increase in 
borrowing by  households  and firms during the economic upswing. The increase 
in debt is not  necessarily a problem  as it can be seen as reflecting, on the one 
hand,  the view  of  households  and  firms  regarding  the growth  in  their  wealth 
and, on the other hand, their desire to smooth out their expenditures over time. 
The debt poses  a problem  when the acute financial situation of  the households 
and  firms  deteriorates  and  the  outlook  for  their  future  consumption  and 
investment  possibilities  takes  a  turn  for  the  worse:  nothing  remains  from  the 
times of swift growth and widespread optimism except "debt overhang". 
The professors'  views  on the debt  problem  more  or less  coincide with  each 
other:  the  main  dilemma  of  the  recession  is  high  indebtedness  and  it  is 
increasingly hindering  the resumption of  growth.  Of  the professors,  the Swede 
Hans Tson Soderstrom concentrates his analysis on the Fisherian debt-deflation 
problem  and his conclusions do not preclude the possibility  that the solving of 
the problem  will  require some degree of  "inflation". Professor  Bordes, on the 
other  hand,  maintains  that  this  is  not  a  viable  option  by  arguing  that  the 
situation  of  the  debtors  cannot  be  improved  in  this  manner  since  under  the 
present circumstances the financial markets react by raising interest rates, which 
only  exacerbates  the situation of  debtors. Professor  Currie, on the other hand, 
does not  tackle this  issue directly but  he does address  it  indirectly. He asserts 
that  the  aim  of  monetary  policy  in  the  future should  be  to  keep  the  markka 
competitive and  interest  rates  low,  the  latter  of  which  will support the  rise  in 
asset prices and in this way ease the situation of debtors. The professors seem 
many  times  to  start  from  the  premise  that  the  deregulation  of  the  financial 
markets  has  been the primus motors of  growth in the late 1980s and  that  the 
dispelling of growth optimism at the start of the new decade was a result of the halt  in the credit boom  and  credit contraction. In fact,  Currie characterises  the 
1980s with  the term  "growth  bubble"  and  like  Bordes  he emphasises,  among 
other  things,  the significance of  the  deregulation shock vis-a-vis  the  terms-of- 
trade  shock.  This  type  of  thinking  about  the  non-fundamental  growth  of  the 
economy is problematic, not least of  all in Finland's case. Changes in the terms 
of  trade  of  the  industrialised  countries,  the  international  easing  of  monetary 
policy  in  1987  and  subsequent  tightening  in  1989  tell  of  the  profound 
fundamental  changes  in  external  factors  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Finnish 
economy,  the impact of which on growth in the industrialised countries cannot 
be underestimated.  It  is perhaps more reasonable to  think that deregulation  has 
exerted  a  powerful  leverage effect on the  changes  in  the  fundamentals of  the 
(world)  economy,  i.e.  the  changed  financial  conditions  have  altered  the 
functioning  of  the  propagation  mechanism  by  which  the  changes  in  the 
fundamentals are transmitted to the economy. 
Moreover,  especially  in  Finland's  case  the  shock  was  concentrated  on  the 
structure of  foreign  trade.  The role played  by  the  collapse in  eastern trade  is 
possibly  underestimated  in  both  the  domestic  discussion  as  well  as  in  the 
reports. It should also be emphasised that the collapse in  eastern trade  meant  a 
particularly large shock to the real exchange rate. This, together with the sizable 
negative terms-of-trade shock, makes Finland's  situation very difficult, not least 
of  all  from  the  standpoint  of  the  design  economic  policy.  One  would  have 
hoped for a more thorough analysis of this particular matter in the reports. 
1.3 Economic Policy Dilemma 
The professors did not absolve the economic policy followed in Finland, even if 
their report  is  interpreted  to mean that  the shocks have been  non-discretionary 
and  external  in  nature.  It  can always  be  asked,  in  hindsight,  whether,  at  that 
time,  an  optimal economic policy  was  followed.  The situation prevailing  then 
was  a  by  no  means  simple  one;  very  little  is  known  even  in  theory  about 
optimal economic policy when there are major shocks to the terms-of-trade,  the 
real  exchange rate and  asset prices.  The dependence of  the optimal policy  on 
the  specific  source  of  the  disturbance  makes  it  more  difficult  to  work  out 
appropriate  responses.  The  dilemma  of  economic  policy  is  not  the  high 
indebtedness  of  economic  agents  but  rather  the  factors  associated  with 
expectations which  feed  pessimism  and  pose  a  threat  to  the  upswing  in  the 
economy. As regards the latter, the vital issue is not their rationality,  but rather 
their self-fulfilling nature. Monetary Policy: Strong Markka Policy 
The exchange rate plays a pivotal role in economic policy  in Finland. This can 
be  seen in  the reports  under  consideration  since the role of  monetary  policy, 
and especially exchange rate policy, is dealt with in some depth. 
The Finnish  markka  and  thus  the overall  monetary  policy  pursued  have  been 
plagued  by  a  long  history  of  devaluations.  The professors  see the old  trade- 
weighted  exchange  rate  system  against  this  background.  Theoretically,  the 
choice of  an rate system  is  typically  analyzed as a choice between  a fixed  and 
floating  exchange  rate  system.  Our  knowledge  of  the  fixed  exchange  rate 
system  has  been  enhanced  considerably  by  the  literature  dealing  with  the 
credibility of exchange rate target zones and the independence and reputation of 
the central bank  as well  as by  the empirical experience gained  in Finland  and 
other  European  countries.  The  Finnish  markka  can  be  treated  as  a  fixed  or 
floating  currency  depending  upon  the  approach  and  objectives.  The  foreign 
experts also do this and benefit widely from the lessons of the recent literature. 
2.1 Revaluation of the Markka in November 1989 
The professors  took a very  critical view  of  the  November  1989 revaluation  of 
the  markka  in  the reports. Professor  Currie regarded  it  as  a  tactical  error. The 
overheating of  the economy  was then  already  abating, and  the situation would 
have  called  for  a  decline  in  interest  rates.  The  revaluation  weakened  the 
credibility of  the fixed parity and  increased the potential  for speculation against 
the markka. A revaluation  would  perhaps  have  been  appropriate  much earlier, 
but  a  floating  exchange rate,  in  combination  with  a  suitable monetary  policy 
anchor would have worked better, Currie states in hindsight. Professor Christian 
Bordes  also  questions  the  appropriateness  of  this  decision,  partly  for  similar 
reasons.  He asserts  that  asset  prices  had  already  started  to  fall,  reflecting  the 
end  of  the  boom.  Bordes  sees  that  the  revaluation  was  prompted  partly  by 
international trends prevailing  at the time.  Central banks round  the world  were 
concerned  about  the  acceleration  of  inflation  and  tightened  their  monetary 
policy  after  having  eased  it  previously  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1987 stock 
market crisis. 
Professor  Hans  Tson Soderstrom sees the  1989 revaluation  as an unsuccessful 
attempt  to  curb  credit  expansion.  He  goes  even  farther  and  asserts  that  in 
general a revaluation cannot stem the overheating of  the domestic economy, but 
rather  it  can only  serve to weaken competitiveness. A revaluation  should only 
be used  to  counteract  an  external inflationary  shock. In  addition  a  revaluation 
weakens  the  credibility  of  a  fixed  exchange rate  since as  domestic  inflation 
accelerates too much valuation of the currency becomes possible.  The end result 
is  that  the fixed  exchange rate  loses  its  role  as  an  inflation  norm,  for which 
purpose it  was originally adopted.  In our opinion Soderstrom's reasoning is on 
target if  we wish to analyze the matter purely  from the standpoint of the fixed 
exchange rate regime. 2.2 Pegging of Finland's  Markka to the ECU: 
the Strong Markka Policy and its Failure 
The professors emphasized the significance of the pegging of the markka to the 
ECU in  the summer of  1991 and  analyze it  thoroughly.  They  draw two con- 
clusions in  this respect.  They assert that  it  was not until  this  time that Finland 
attempted fully to commit to a fixed exchange rate. Linking the Finnish markka 
to the Deutschmark entailed the choice of the so-called strong markka policy. 
Professor  Bordes raises the question of the failure of the strong markka policy. 
He suspects  that  pegging  the  markka  to  the  ECU  did  not  reflect  a  carefully 
considered  stand  on  exchange  rate  policy  but  rather  it  was  a  reaction  to  the 
decisions  taken  previously  in  Sweden  and  Norway.  He  is  right,  given  the 
swiftness of  the  decision  and  brief  period  allowed  for public debate.  Pegging 
the markka to the ECU means  accepting low European inflation in  a situation 
where Finland's  inflation exceeds this level. He points to  Finland's  high degree 
of  price  and  wage  rigidity  and  to  the  limited  influence  of  the  government's 
budget. Moreover, the credibility of  the stable markka policy suffered owing to 
the weak position of the Bank of Finland. 
Professor  Currie highlights the special features of  the Finnish economy, which 
made it  extremely difficult to maintain  the parity  between  the Finnish markka 
and the Deutschmark. First, the openness of the Finnish economy was relatively 
small in  the  1980s, which reduced  the efficiency of  the exchange rate band  as 
an  inflationary  anchor.  Second,  fluctuations  in  the  terms  of  trade  have  been 
relatively  large  compared  with other  OECD countries.  Third,  the maintenance 
of  a  fixed  exchange  rate  is  understandably  difficult  owing  to  the  wide 
variability of the real exchange rate associated with the credit cycle. 
Soderstrom also sees the ECU peg as signifying a  "new policy", but  maintains 
that the timing of the peg as well as its level was wrong. Soderstrom is brief  in 
his  appraisal  of  the  strong  markka  policy  in  Finland.  He  notes  that,  unlike 
Sweden  and  Norway,  Finland  never  genuinely  sought  to  follow  an  anti- 
inflationary policy and become  a strong currency country: the 1989 revaluation 
gave the impression that  it was possible to adjust the exchange rate.  The 1991 
devaluation reinforced  this impression and in 1992 the fixed  exchange rate was 
abandoned  without  a  fight.  The  possible  price  for  this  policy  will  become 
evident in  the future.  It  is  to  Soderstrom's  credit that  he is straightforward in 
drawing attention  to  the severe problem of  credibility in  Finnish monetary 
policy. 
Bordes notes, as did Soderstrom, that  the fixed  rate policy was not  necessarily 
very well planned  in order to achieve low  inflation and stable prices.  The link 
to the Deutschmark was not desirable and moreover it was not sustainable. 
The fixed  rate  regime  and  policy  of  a  stable or strong markka  has  a  longer 
history  than  the  peg to  the ECU.  It  can  be  seen as  beginning  with  the  1983 
devaluation or at the latest with the currency speculation of 1986. The pegging 
of  the markka  to  the  ECU per  se was not  widely  called  into  question  in  the public  debate.  It  can  be  seen  as  a  political  decision  that  preceded  Finland's 
application  for  membership  of  the  EC the  next  spring.  It  was  regarded  as 
largely  a technical change in  the composition of the exchange rate basket.  The 
discussion  was  certainly  heated,  but  it  largely  revolved  around  the  parity  at 
which the peg to the ECU should occur. In this regard the calls were largely for 
a  change from  the  low  parity  corresponding  to  the  1989 revaluation.  In  the 
economic  policy  debate  the  criticism  of  the  "strong markka  policy"  did  not 
strengthen until after the pegging of the markka to the ECU. 
2.3 Exchange Rate Policy and Finland's  Economic Crisis 
All the professors, but Currie and  Soderstrom in particular,  count on the effect 
of  the depreciation of  the markka  as  a fundamental  part  of  the recovery  from 
the current recession.  Bordes  and  Soderstrom  take a more critical view of  the 
devaluation  policy  over  the  long  run.  Bordes  ambiguously  notes  that  no 
European  country  can  solve  its  economic  problems  at  the  expense  of  its 
neighbours.  Professor  David  Currie  clearly  supports  the  use  of  floating rates, 
but in a way that hinders the pressures on the markka to appreciate. 
The  adoption  of  an  economic  policy  based  on  considerable  price 
competitiveness  has  gained  some  understanding  in  light  of  Finland's 
exceptionally  deep  recession,  and,  in  particular,  in  light  of  the  collapse  in 
eastern  trade.  For  this  reason  Finland's  exchange  rate  policy  is  not  widely 
regarded  as  an  aggressive  beggar-thy-neighbour  policy.  Even  though  the 
depreciation of  the  markka  can be  regarded  as  necessary  for cyclical  reasons, 
the  conditions  under  which  monetary  policy  will  be  conducted  in  the  future 
must be addressed. 
2.4 Finland's Exchange Rate Regime in the Future 
As  regards  the  general  characteristics  of  an  exchange  rate  regime  from 
Finland's  standpoint,  Bordes  is  clearly  the  most  thorough.  He  ends  up 
recommending that  Finland  adopt a programme to fulfill criteria such as those 
set out in  the Maastricht Treaty  to  pave  the way  for a  return  to  a  fixed  rate. 
Currie's  point  of  departure,  as mentioned  above,  is  to  let the markka  continue 
floating. 
In the Finnish economic policy  debate, attitudes towards floating exchange rate 
regimes  were critical  in  the  early  1970s'  primarily  due to  income  distribution 
and structural reasons. It was felt that the best way to protect  real earnings and 
to enhance diversification of the business structure in the economy was offered 
by  fixed  exchange  rates.  It  has  nevertheless  proved  to  be  the  case  that  the 
debate  on  the  virtues  of  the  various  exchange  rate  regimes,  especially  in 
connection with Finnish incomes policy  is neither constructive nor  useful.  The 
question is not one of different exchange rate regimes, of the depreciation and 
appreciation  of  the  currency  per  se,  but  rather  one  of  the  economic  policy 
regime and  its credibility  in  general  and  of  the  credibility of  monetary  policy regardless of  any  particular  exchange rate regime.  Empirical findings showing 
no causal link from exchange rate regime to differences in economic success in 
different countries should be taken more seriously. 
Professor  Bordes  recommends  a  return  to  fixed  exchange  rates,  and,  taking 
EMU as benchmark, maintains that floating rates cannot be optimal for Finland 
over the long run. He thinks that  monetary  policy  is not  efficient and  credible 
enough  to  stabilize  the  economy  and  to  achieve  and  maintain  low  inflation 
under a floating exchange rate regime. 
The problem  with  Bordes'  argument  is  that  precisely  the  same  logic  can  be 
used  to claim that the fixed exchange rate is not appropriate for Finland. In this 
respect  the  credibility  problems  associated  with  fixed  rates,  in  particular,  are 
underestimated.  The short period  of a floating currency  up until  now  indicates 
that the results of the most widely applied Mundell-Flemming model regarding 
the  independence  of  monetary  policy  are  not  applicable.  The  floating  rate 
regime does not offer complete monetary  policy  autonomy if  the credibility  of 
monetary  policy  is  weak.  Due  to  this  problem  Finland  and  several  other 
countries  with  weak  central  banks  have  set  an  explicit  numerical  inflation 
norm as the ultimate goal of their monetary'  policy. 
In  the Finnish  public  debate,  not  least  of  all  in  academic circles,  high  hopes 
have  been  pinned  on  monetary  policy  to  stem  the  recession.  But  it  is 
particularly  difficult  to  identify  that  public  discussion  supporting  the  central 
bank's  efforts and which analyzes the prerequisites for optimal monetary policy 
and  suggests conditions sustaining that policy. It is characteristic of the present 
situation that even as clear an aim as a stable currency is to the central bank, it 
has  not  gained  much  understanding  at  all  in  society  in  general  and  among 
academic  economists  in  particular.  The non-prevalence  of  this  theme  in  the 
public  debate in  Finland,  quite  contrary  to  the  long  experience  elsewhere  in 
Europe actually shows how truly far Finland still is from Europe. 
Bordes notes  that  switching to fixed  rates cannot happen  in a credible fashion 
"over night",  but  rather the establishment of a regime must be started  "today". 
The credibility  of  fixed  rates  hinges,  in  his  opinion,  on the behaviour  of  the 
labour  market.  Bordes  refers  to  the  experiences  of  the  inter-war  period  and 
asserts that Finland  appeared  to  survive the depression better  than  the average 
since the markka  was  floating.  This occurred  because  the depreciation  of  the 
markka brought deflation to a halt,  i.e.  the depreciation had  a stabilizing effect 
on prices and real interest rates. Bordes doubts the efficiency of this channel of 
influence  in  the  current  situation  on  account,  among  other  things,  of  wage 
formation, which reflects the inflationary expectations of wage setters prevailing 
at  the  time.  The  professors  do  not,  however,  analyze  the  role  of  Finland's 
inflation target from the point of view of combatting deflation. It can namely be 
argued  that  the  inflation  target  if  credible  allows  for  expansionary  monetary 
policy  in order to curb deflation without strengthening inflationary expectations. 
Bordes  does not  analyze the optimality  of  the exchange rate  regime from the 
standpoint of  the main sources of disturbances impinging on the economy. The 
theoretical literature namely  indicates, among other things,  that  in cases  where the  main  source  of  aggregate  disturbances  impinging  on  the  economy  is  in 
export prices, then the optimal solution from  the standpoint of  macroeconomic 
stability is to adhere to flexible exchange rates. 
The efficiency  of devaluation policy in Finland  is limited  by  the high elasticity 
of  nominal wages with respect to inflation (0.67), while rigidities  in the relative 
wage structure undermine competitiveness and are clearly an important factor as 
far as explaining the  "devaluation cycle"  is concerned. Bordes could  have been 
more  specific  in  his  analysis  on  this  point  by  taking  an  explicit  stand  on 
whether  Finland  can  be  regarded  as  a  country  where  wages  react  easily  to 
inflation  but  not  unemployment.  According  to  Bordes'  table  the  elasticity  of 
wages  with  respect  to  unemployment  is  -0.49.  The  sensitivity  of  wages  to 
inflation  and  unemployment  together  determine  the  efficiency  of  monetary 
policy. 
On  the  basis  of  estimated  wage  equations  Bordes  suspects  that  flexible 
exchange rates  (or  a devaluation  policy)  is  optimal for Finland  over  the  long 
run.  In  order to  lend support to  his  doubts he constructs a simulation test,  the 
purpose  of  which  is  to  track  Finland's  past  economic development  under  the 
conterfactual  assumption of flexible exchange rates. The simulation is based on 
the assumption that 
a)  the aim of economic policy is annual growth of 6 % in nominal GDP, 
b)  in  the short run monetary  policy facilitates the adjustment of the economy, 
and 
c)  monetary  policy  takes  into  account  the  possible  instability  of  monetary 
behaviour. 
According to  the simulations  nominal  GDP would  have  remained  well  on the 
target  path.  In  particular  nominal  GDP  would  have  returned  to  its  long-run 
growth path already at the end of  1992. This would nevertheless have required 
that monetary  policy had been especially sensitive to deviations from the target 
path  for nominal GDP. The growth in the monetary base should have changed 
by  20 % for each  1 % deviation from the target path for GDP growth! Bordes 
concludes that monetary policy alone would not have been sufficient to stabilize 
the economy  in the short run  and  the  price  level  in  the long run.  He has his 
doubts about the efficiency of monetary policy  in this respect also in the future. 
When  considering Finland's  exchange rate  regime  in  the future the professors 
also bring up the interesting question of  a Nordic Monetary  System. From  the 
references  to  common  cyclical  developments  and  labour  markets  professor 
Bordes draws the conclusion that the optimal exchange rate regime would  be a 
fixed  exchange  rate  regime  between  Finland  and  the  other  Nordic  countries, 
especially  Sweden. Bordes starts from the premise that  Europe and  EMU will 
still be the publicly accepted goal in Finland. In this regard  Bordes hopes to see 
clear actions by which the authorities in Finland  would convey their intentions. 
Such actions would include, for instance, the de facto strengthening of the Bank 
of  Finland's  independence  in  line  with  the  Maastricht  Treaty  as  a  signal  of 
Finland's  intension  to change its main  institutions  and ultimately participate  in 
the adoption of a single European currency. 3  Deregulation of  Capital Markets 
In  section one it  was noted  that  the deregulation  of  the  financial markets  has 
exacerbated the already wide cyclical fluctuations  in the Finnish economy since 
the  mid-1980s.  As  a  result  of  deregulation  the credit  cycle has  not,  however, 
been  characteristic of  only  Finland.  The professors  maintain that  the problems 
stemming  from  the  liberalization  of  the  financial  markets  were  unavoidable 
since the pressures to deregulate were overwhelming. 
There are two features  in Finland's  experiences  that  are worth noting. First the 
tax  deductibility  of  interest  expenses  has  been  regarded  as  a  significant 
distortionary  factor,  the  significance  of  which  is  reinforced  in  a  deregulated 
market.  Tax  induced  incentives  to  borrow  increased  indebtedness  to  a 
significant extent. On the other hand, debt repayment in the midst of a recession 
only prolongs  the recession.  Another distinguishing feature is the sharp growth 
in  the  foreign  debt.  In  this  respect  professor  Currie  is  very  critical  of  those 
taking foreign currency loans as well as banks and regulatory authorities. Those 
who took foreign currency loans were foolish when they did not understand that 
lending rates on markka loans were higher for the very reason that the markets 
were aware that a devaluation of the markka was possible.  The banks especially 
failed  to  appreciate  the risk  of  credit  losses  in  a  situation where  the  markka 
depreciates.  Furthermore,  the  authorities  were  at  fault  for  not  requiring  that 
banks make provisions for this currency risk. 
Professor  Cunie  asserts  that  it  is  the  sharp  growth  in  foreign  currency 
borrowing  in  particular  which  explains  much  of  the  problems  related  to  the 
recession.  The growth  in  foreign  debt stemmed  from  errors  in  the  pricing  of 
credit, especially in the sense that the cost of borrowing did not reflect the true 
risks. 
Bordes,  like  Soderstrom,  provides  an  in-depth  evaluation  of  the  stages  of 
deregulation.  Bordes derives several conditions  for the success of deregulation 
on the basis of economic theory.  These include the gradual deregulation of the 
domestic  financial  markets  before  the  deregulation  of  foreign  capital 
movements.  In  Bordes'  view  the  deregulation  process  carried  out  in  Finland 
fulfilled  this  condition.  On  the  other  hand,  the third  condition,  involving  the 
view that successful deregulation of the financial markets must  be rooted  in  a 
well-structured  vision,  was  not  fulfilled  in  all  respects.  At  issue  is  the 
deficiency of bank supervision  and  outdated  legislation.  Bordes  is also critical 
of the deregulation of lending rates before deposit rates and the development of 
the money market on the basis of bank Cds. Above all the common pricing of 
Cds  regardless  of  the  issuer  created  an  incentive  for  banks  to  finance  risky 
business  (the  so-called  moral  hazard  problem).  This  option  for  the  banks  to 
generateds  so-called  secondary  reserves,  which  would  also  include  their 
holdings of Cds issued by  the Bank of  Finland,  is a significant  factor attecting 
the efficiency of monetary  policy,  a problem  that  hopefully  will  be dealt with 
before the next stage of the economic cycle. Soderstrom asserts that the deregulation of the financial markets was a must for 
to an open economy due to the integration of the international financial markets 
as well  as  the European integration process.  The alternative  would  have been 
the  massive  flight  of  business  activities.  He maintains  that  controlling  credit 
expansion  in  the late 1980s would  not  have been  possible.  The growth  in  the 
volume of credit was demand-driven owing to the fixed exchange rate. 
It would  nevertheless  have been  possible,  in Soderstrom's  opinion, to have  an 
impact on the demand for credit by  lifting foreign exchange regulations sooner, 
moving up  the timetable for implementing  tax reforms and by  tightening fiscal 
policy.  The only  measure  taken  to  curb  credit  demand  in  Soderstrom's  view 
was the March 1989 revaluation.  Bordes sees the use of the cash reserve system 
as one of these measures too. 
Fiscal Policy 
The professors'  evaluation  of  fiscal  policy  in  the context of  the growth during 
the 1980s and the analysis of an appropriate fiscal policy stance is rather scanty 
in the reports.  In particular they  do not  analyze whether  the floating exchange 
rate, on the one hand, and the inflationary target of the Bank of Finland, on the 
other hand, set any  explicit constraints  on the fiscal policy regime. The failure 
to control demand is noted almost in unison and the analysis of the fiscal policy 
stance  is  dominated  by  the  problems  of  the  public  debt,  even  though 
Soderstrom  addresses  some questions about stimulative measures  via  monetary 
and fiscal policy. 
It  goes without  saying that  the professors  view  the sustainability  of  the public 
debt as the number one priority of fiscal policy. The fact that the growth of the 
public debt is caused by  the explosive growth in the primary deficit perhaps has 
little information content, but the (intertemporal)  sustainability of the growth of 
the debt  has.  One would  have expected  a deeper  analysis  of this  issue by  the 
professors.  According  to  the  budget  arithmetics,  the  growth  of  the  primary 
deficit and GDP  has an important bearing on the sustainability of the debt. The 
professors  have  stressed  the  significance  of  public  savings  for  reducing  the 
deficit, but  it still seems that also the sustainability of  the public debt suggests 
that  fiscal policy  be designed  to generate savings in public expenditures  while 
simultaneously fostering economic growth. 
It  is  worth  emphasising  that  the  sustainability  of  the  debt  is  intrinsically  a 
dynamic, intertemporal problem, where the leeway in fiscal policy with respect 
to cuts (or increases) in expenditure lies in their allocation over time or in their 
timing, assuming of course that the political system is able to commit itself in a 
credible fashion  to  long-term  cuts  in  public  expenditure.  It  would  have  been 
hoped  that  the  professors  had  delved  more  deeply  into  the  problems  of  the 
design  of  long-term  fiscal policy,  not  least of  all because the leeway  in fiscal 
policy  is  the key  issue in the public  debate on Finnish economic policy  at  the 
moment,  even  though  the  perceived  external  constraints  are  to  some  extent overemphasised  in  this  debate.  The analysis  of  the  design  of  fiscal  policy  is 
limited  almost  entirely  to  Soderstrom's  observation  that  monetary  and  fiscal 
policy  can  end  up  in  a  self-fulfilling  deflationary  spiral  owing to  the  worse- 
than-expected  development  of  the economy  so that  an  expansionary  monetary 
and  fiscal  policy  can  contain  the  seeds  of  wisdom,  assuming  that  the  debt 
problem does not get out of hand. Of course! 
5  Conclusions: What about Labour Markets, and Incomes 
Policy? 
One cornerstone of Finnish economic policy  is incomes policy  - at least we are 
accustomed to thinking so and acting accordingly when implementing economic 
policy.  We are accustomed to placing our faith in  the  possibilities of  incomes 
policy as an instrument of economic policy. For this reason it seems worthwhile 
to end  this  appraisal with the scant views of  the professors  on incomes policy 
or actually  one interesting aspect of  the significance of Finnish labour markets 
and incomes policy regarding the possibilities and choices of economic policy. 
First the professors assert that the labour market system may be faced with the 
need to change the wage structure in favour of the open sector given the narrow 
margin for overall wage increases in the economy. It may even be impossible to 
reach such an outcome as a  centralised  bargaining  solution. And  what  in  the 
professors'  opinion  is  the connection  between  inflation  and  the labour  market 
system or incomes policy  in Finland? Here the views are divergent. According 
to Currie centralized wage formation has been moderate and it has not been the 
source of inflationary impulses to the economy. Soderstrom, on the other hand, 
maintains  .that  incomes  policy  as  a  component  of  the  "Finnish  model"  of 
economic  policy  has  maintained  inflationary  pressures.  Finland  has  not  taken 
care of its employment with active incomes policy but rather with exchange rate 
policy, which has led to the low credibility of the fixed exchange rate owing to 
repeated devaluations. In  this respect Soderstrom asserts that incomes policy 
in Finland has failed. This is an interesting argument, not least of all because 
the labour  market  system  is  viewed  from  the  perspective  of  the credibility  of 
economic policy. This may be worthy of further research from the standpoint of 
the feasibility of the Bank of Finland's  inflation target. 